Liku Transformasi Politik Mesir

Qardawi mengatakan Mubarak hanya membilang hari tiada siapa yang menyokongnya. Seluruh rakyat Mesir daripada berbagai golongan sudah muak dengannya. Penulis lain mengatakan kerajaan Mubarak akan segera jatuh kerana sokongan popular ke atasnya telah lesap.

Soalannya bilakah Mubarak benar-benar akan meletakkan jawatan. Beliau mengatakan tidak akan bertanding pada pilihanraya Presiden pada bulan September ini. Fareed Zakaria daripada CNN berkata Mubarak tidak dapat bertahan dalam tempoh lapan bulan itu.

Apabila Mubarak meletakkan jawatan, permainan baru dan perubahan akan berlaku. Apakah bentuk perubahan yang dijangka mengambil tempat. ? Untuk siapakah perubahan itu akan memihak, Pihak berkuasa tentera Mesir , kepentingan Amerika dengan Eropah dan Israel, dan rakyat biasa Mesir. ?

Bulan september 1980, kerajaan Turki digulingkan dalam satu rampasan tentera. Pihak tentera berkerjasama dengan para pemimpin awam sementara beralih kepada demokrasi damai berlandaskan perlembagaan baru 1982 dan pilihan raya tahun 1983. Perkembangan Turki itu memberi ilham kepada nasionalis Mesir terutamanya Parti Wafd. Jadi pada tahun 1984, rancangan disusun berdasarkan pengalaman Turki dan disampaikan oleh Ibrahim Abaza, Yusuf hamed Zaki dan sekumpulan yang lain. Rancangan ini membayangkan kerajaan sementara yang disokong oleh tentera boleh menjaga ketenteraman awam, mencipta ruang politik yang selamat dan membimbing bangsa ke arah demokrasi. Surat khabar Mesir membantah rancangan tersebut. Rejim Mubarak yang baru berkuasa beberapa tahun mengabaikannya. Begitu juga pentadbiran Amerika yang sering bertukar presiden mendengar dengan sopan tetapi memilih untuk tidak mengunakan tekanan kepada sekutu mereka di Kaherah.

Mantan Ketua Agensi Tenaga Atom Antarabangsa, Mohammed El Baradei mengatakan orang ramai bersetuju masa transisi diikuti dengan “kerajaan Perpaduan Kebangsaan yang akan menyediakan asas-asas perlembagaan yang baru, bebas dan pilihan raya yang adil.” Pada masa yang sama tentera diharapkan dapat mengawal ketenteraman awam. Untuk mengelakkan penyalahan kuasa, rancangan pembangkang dengan tidak membenarkan mana-mana tokoh mempunyai kuasa monopoli. Kabinet sementara akan menguruskan perkara-perkara politik dan perubahan kepada demokrasi.

Mungkin Mesir memerlukan kepada Presiden Sementara yang akan menyelia draf perlembagaan baru. Selepas masa sementara itu Mesir bolehlah melangkah ke kotak undi. Pihak tentera menjaga keselamatan pengundi dan pihak antarabangsa mengawasi pengundian yang dilakukan dan memberi sijil menunjukkan pilihan raya yang bebas dan adil.

Mengikut Amir Taheri dari New York Post semua orang Mesir bersetuju “perubahan” telah bermula. Tetapi mereka tidak sepakat apakah yang dimaksudkan dengan “perubahan” itu atau ianya ditentukan oleh apa yang berlaku di “jalanan” atau dikoreografi oleh regim yang memerintah.

Sementara itu berbagai pihak menunjukkan kegusaran mereka sekiranya demokrasi sebenarnya diadakan di Mesir. Sejauh ini hubungan Mubarak dengan Israel berdasarkan ketakutan bersama sekiranya Iran menjadi kuasa kuat dan bertambahnya kuasa penyokong-penyokong Islam. Tanpa Mubarak, Israel takut ianya hanya mempunyai dua sekutu iaitu Jordan dan Pihak Berkuasa Palestin. Buat pertama kalinya sejak berdekad-dekad ianya dikepong oleh negara-negara yang memusuhinya.

Pihak Barat di dalamnya Amerika, Eropah dan Israel kuatir dengan menuduh Ikhwan Muslimin hanya menunggu kesempatan untuk mengambil alih pemerintahan. Tony Blair, mantan Perdana Menteri Inggeris pada hari isnin (31 Januari 2011) mengingatkan,” kamu tidak sahaja memilih pemerintahan dan gerakan demokrasi, kamu juga memiliki pihak lain, terutama Ikhwan yang akan mengambil arah yang berbeza. Kita perlu cemas untuk memenuhi aspirasi rakyat”.

Israel menceritakan pengalam ngeri mereka tentang demokrasi. Mantan diplomat, Eli Avidar mengutarakan bahawa pemilihan umum membuatkan Hamas berkuasa di Gaza. Kerana tekanan Presiden (George W) Bush dan Setiausaha Negara Condoleeza Rice terhadap Israel dalam pemilihan demokrasi di Palestin. Apa yang berlaku Hamas mengambil alih dan inilah pemilihan demokrasi pertama dan terakhir,” Katanya. Sudah tentu perkara yang sama akan berlaku di Mesir.

"Jika mereka mengambil kepemimpinan selepas pemilu demokratis, saya percaya bahwa demokrasi tidak akan pernah ada di Mesir karena faktanya adalah, sekiranya mereka menguasai kekuasaan, mereka tidak akan meninggalkannya," katanya.
Ketakutan Israel bahawa kerajaan Mesir diperintah oleh Ikhwanul Muslimin juga bererti "tidak hanya kekuatan Islam lebih kuat di Gaza, tetapi juga di Tebing Barat, yang pada saat ini diperintah oleh Pihak Berkuasa Palestin yang didominasi oleh Fatah, serta di Jordan, juga bererti Israel akan merasa dirinya dikepung (surrounded) dengan cara ianya tidak pernah berlaku dalam beberapa dekad, menurut Ethan Bronner dari Jerusalem dalam New York Times.

Sekiranya situasi di Mesir menjadi lebih tidak stabil dan terutamanya sekiranya Presiden Mubarak yang digulingkan, tidak diragukan lagi Amerika Syarikat, sebagai kuasa empayar dunia, akan memanggil unit khas antarabangsa untuk melindungi Terusan Suez. Ini, tentu saja, berada dalam kepentingan ekonomi mereka. Mungkin mereka akan mengundang Inggeris, Perancis, Israel dan negara-negara Eropah lain bagi bersama-sama menjadi kepentingan Terusan Suez.

Beberapa pengalaman yang buruk demokrasi hendaklah dielakkan. Apa yang berlaku di Algeria pada tahun 1991 apabila berlaku pilihan raya bebas dengan kemenangan pergerakan Islam, diikuti dengan rampasan kuasa oleh tentera dan perang saudara. Hamas apabila kemenangannya tidak di akui oleh pihak antarabangsa walaupun memenanginya dalam pilihan raya yang bebas dan adil.

Begitu juga sekiranya kita melihat Iraq, keputusan yang dibuat pada awal-awal bulan (setelah Saddam Hussein berakhir) akhirnya mencipta suasana hingga menjadi perang saudara.

Menurut Fareed Zakaria, “Kita harus cuba sebanyak yang boleh untuk membantu orang Mesir memahami bahawa apa yang mereka inginkan adalah sebuah peralihan yang berakhir dengan menghasilkan demokrasi liberal yang stabil.”

“Kunci yang lain adalah peranan tentera. Sebenarnya Mesir adalah benar-benar sebuah kediktatoran tentera, dengan seorang warga awam duduk di bahagian atas. Tentera tidak akan diam-diam membolehkan suatu tatanan demokrasi yang benar-benar mengambil semua kuasa dan hak-hak istimewa, sehingga tentera akan ingin mempunyai peranan yang sangat kuat dalam proses, dan yang mungkin tak dapat dielakkan. Kita juga tidak mahu terjadi seperti di Pakistan di mana proses demokrasi berakhir di mana orang awam dipilih, namun tentera yang memegang kuasa yang sesungguhnya.”

Whither Tunisia’s “Jasmine Revolution”?

NEW YORK – As I try to grasp the full meaning of the Tunisian Revolution and gauge its future, I am looking at my desk, where I have spread two issues of The New York Times, both featuring Tunisia on their front pages. The two issues are dated 23 years apart.

The first is a yellowish, wrinkled copy from November 7, 1987. The article beneath the headline, “A Coup is Reported in Tunisia,” reported the fall of Habib Bourguiba, the aging founder of modern Tunisia and a hero of its independence. He had been ousted in the dead of night in a bloodless coup staged by his prime minister, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali.

In the days that followed, tens of thousands gathered in downtown Tunis to celebrate their deliverance from years of stagnation and uncertainty, caused by Bourguiba’s worsening senility. Ben Ali, the new president, was a hero to most and, in the first years of his rule, deservedly so.

The second front page is from Saturday, January 15, 2011. The headline once again: “President of Tunisia Flees, Capitulating to Protesters.”

This time, however, the report is less clear, less reassuring. Who were the protesters? What motivated them? Where will they drive the country? With Tunisia regarded by most Western analysts as “Arab” and “Islamic,” would there be a “domino effect” in the Middle East?

Looking for answers, I scrutinize the large picture to the left of the headline. A sea of people fills the beautiful, late nineteenth-century Habib Bourguiba Avenue. Some local estimates put the number of protesters on January 14 at between 50,000-60,000.

These are typical, Mediterranean faces, mostly male and young – the oldest seem to be in their thirties. They look clean-shaven; even with a magnifying glass I do not detect a single beard among them.

There are also some young women, but no headscarves, veils, or burqas in sight. To my eyes, the event could be taking place in Barcelona, Lyon, or Naples.

The protesters are holding Tunisian flags or signs bearing various symbols and slogans rejecting Ben Ali and the authoritarianism he represented in his late years. Here, too, I cannot find a single reference to Allah, Islam, or the ummah (community of believers).

All this is to say that what will most likely go down in history as the Jasmine Revolution was, to all appearances, a secular revolution.

Cyberspace has been inundated with tweets and Facebook posts since the uprising began. The messages speak of liberty, freedom of expression, good governance, pluralism, democracy, and human rights. Objectives not in line with these aspirations have been criticized and often shunned. Already, Libya’s leader, Muammar al-Gaddafi, and Qatar television preacher Sheikh Qaradawi have been ridiculed for putting an Arab or Islamist spin on events in Tunisia.

The protesters who ended Ben Ali’s regime are the educated sons and daughters of the large, secular middle class that was built over decades by Habib Bourguiba. Prior to his rule, even before the French takeover in 1881, a line of nationalist leaders stretching back to the late eighteenth century looked to Europe and the Enlightenment for solutions to the country’s problems. Tunisian identity was shaped by this specific history.

That does not bode well for a domino effect, as no other Arab country has either a strong middle class or a tradition of modern, secular government. A revolution in any of these countries might easily bring Islamists to power, but this would have little to do with Tunisia’s secular uprising.

It should be acknowledged that Ben Ali strengthened the foundations of Tunisian exceptionalism, furthering gender equality and separation of religion and state. He achieved an enviable rate of economic development for a country starved of natural resources, helped to eradicate poverty, and deepened Tunisia’s ties with Europe through tourism, trade, and cultural relations.

Unfortunately, however, Ben Ali succumbed to the temptations of corruption and repression, described in great detail by the former United States ambassador to Tunisia, Robert F. Godec, in cables released last month by WikiLeaks.

Despite the extensive physical damage and loss of life inflicted on the country by some of Ben-Ali’s die-hard supporters, the tense and dangerous few days that followed the dictator’s fall did not change the course of the revolution. More remarkably, the Tunisian army played the role of a genuinely professional, neutral, loyal republican institution, acting in support of the civilian process.

As a result, security and normalcy appear to be gradually returning. Initially, a provisional government that included members of the opposition was formed, but the opposition leaders soon left in protest at the number of cabinet holdovers from Ben-Ali’s administration. So an inclusive government is still in the offing. Nevertheless, the new government has expressed a solemn commitment to freedom of information and assembly, the release of all political prisoners, and free and internationally supervised presidential and legislative elections within six months.

The revolution in Tunisia was just a matter of time – a popular uprising to end a system that failed to deliver the free society for which the Tunisian public has long been ready. Looking once more at the news of January 15, I feel pride and hope: pride for a country that has shown the world its readiness to establish a genuine, secular democracy, and hope for what is to come.

Mustapha Tlili is a Tunisian writer, New York University research scholar, and founder and director of the NYU Center for Dialogues. His last novel, Un après-midi dans le desert (An Afternoon in the Desert), won him the Comar d’Or, Tunisia’s highest literary award.

Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2011.
www.project-syndicate.org

The Bourgeois Roots of Tunisia’s Revolution

2011-01-25


PARIS – Tunisia, one of the Arab League’s 22 members, is in the throes of a severe and profound crisis, albeit possibly one with a favorable resolution. It is the smallest North African country, covering 163,000 square kilometers – more or less twice the size of Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg – and containing a population of 10.5 million.

It is also full of charm and moderation in terms of its climate, history, and culture. It once was the pillar of the cultural dynamism and influence of the Roman Republic and Empire. The first African region to be Christianized, it was the land of Saint Augustine and the main source for Catholic evangelism in Africa. Originally mainly Berber, it was conquered by the Arabs, Islamized, and became for centuries a dependency of the Sublime Porte, and therefore Turkish.

It became a French protectorate, not a colony – as in the case of neighboring Algeria – in the nineteenth century. That difference helps explain the relatively greater preservation of Tunisia’s social structures and local traditions.

Upon achieving independence in 1956, Tunisia adopted a French-style republican constitution that established a presidential system of government. The first president, Habib Bourguiba, was the leader of the liberation movement, which emerged victorious much more quickly – and much less violently – than its counterpart in Algeria. A highly Westernized leader, Bourguiba maintained the secular character of the state that he took over from France, as well as many of its economic ties with the West (particularly France, of course), in a much more committed way than Algeria did after it gained independence.

Some rare attempts over the years by Marxist groups to seize power failed. Unlike other African or Middle Eastern countries, Tunisia remained largely a land of free enterprise, allowing for some industrial development. In recent years, it has become Africa’s leading exporter of industrial goods, outperforming even South Africa and Egypt.

In 1987, the aged Bourguiba became too debilitated to continue in office. His interior minister, Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, having been named Prime Minister, soon managed to certify Bourguiba as medically unfit and ousted him from the presidency.

The new leader was already noted for having repressed the Islamic movement, a policy he intensified after becoming President. Non-Muslim and secular Tunisian citizens – and a large part of world opinion, notably in France – were grateful. They made excuses for the brutality that lay behind Ben Ali’s policy, endorsing the results without observing and questioning the means by which they were achieved.

But those means ended up leading to the almost total suppression of any freedom of expression in Tunisia: a censored press, imprisonment of journalists, political trials, and arbitrary arrests within all circles of society, not merely those with ties to the Islamic movement. The aim was to suppress any and all forms of democratic opposition.

Ben Ali’s regime ultimately became a pure dictatorship. He and his family built up empires within the local economy, cornering nearly all sectors and making a fortune for themselves.

But the industrialization policy was maintained. A genuine middle class emerged, comparable to Egypt’s, but unlike that in any other Arab country, with the possible exception of Morocco.

And then, as occurred everywhere else, the global economic crisis that began in 2008 constrained growth, fueling social tensions. Since the press and parliament were muzzled, the only way to relieve those tensions was in the streets.

The police shot at the crowd on several occasions, but proved too weak to intimidate the demonstrators. The decisive moment came when the army abstained from suppressing the protests. Once the army’s refusal to support his regime became clear, Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia, after France refused to welcome him into exile.

For a brief moment, there was hope for a national-unity government, in which Ben Ali’s rump cabinet and the opposition would unite to prepare a presidential election. But an infuriated public would have none of it. The only option left was a coalition comprised of old oppositions, which, given the absence of a respected institutional framework, will make a return to stability slow, difficult, and perilous.

So Tunisia is in danger. Islamism could eventually emerge victorious. But it is also possible that Tunisia is experiencing the Arab world’s first-ever “bourgeois” revolution. If so, Tunisia’s uprising could be a game-changing event for the entire region.

Michel Rocard is a former Prime Minister of France and a former leader of the Socialist Party.

Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2011.
www.project-syndicate.org

Mubarak's statement didn't go far enough-Fareed Zakaria

http://edition.cnn.com/2011/OPINION/02/01/zakaria.egypt.us/index.html?hpt=T2

February 2, 2011 -- Updated 1110 GMT (1910 HKT)

New York (CNN) -- Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's announcement Tuesday that he will turn over power to an elected successor in September doesn't go nearly far enough, says analyst Fareed Zakaria.

"Mubarak is going to have to go," Zakaria said in an interview, adding that he will not be able to stay in office for eight more months. "But the manner in which he goes and the nature of the transition is going to be very important. So I hope the United States is using what influence it has to try to make sure that there's a transition that makes sense and doesn't lead to chaos or allowing any one group to capture the political process."

Mubarak's announcement that he would end his 30 years of rule in September came after massive protests in Egypt for the past eight days. But many protesters proclaimed they were unsatisfied with his statement and called for him to leave office immediately.

The author and host of CNN's "Fareed Zakaria GPS" spoke to CNN on Thursday. Here is an edited transcript:

CNN: What do you think of the way the administration is handling the crisis in Egypt?

Fareed Zakaria: I think the administration is getting the balance right now, if reports are correct that President Obama has delivered a message to Mubarak that urges him to announce that he will not seek the presidency again. But privately U.S. officials should be further urging that he announce a transition plan immediately. He won't be able to stick around till September.

CNN: So what should happen next?

Zakaria: The best course would be for Mubarak to get ahead of these events and announce a process by which it is clear that he is not going to be president.
I think there is a technical problem that most people have not focused on. Under the Egyptian constitution, if Mubarak resigns, it immediately triggers a new election within 60 days. And in the midst of everything that is going on in Egypt, that is not the ideal solution.

So perhaps what he should do is announce that he's going to resign at a certain point -- but in the interim create a constitutional committee that can amend or rewrite the Egyptian constitution so that all elections, parliamentary or presidential, take place under new rules which will be free and fair, unlike the old rules that were completely stacked in favor of Mubarak and his party.

CNN: What's the potential path to democracy in Egypt?

Zakaria: I think there will have to be a much greater role for public participation, elections and democracy. The more difficult part is: Will there be a transition to constitutionalism, the rule of law and the protection of human rights?
That's always been the tricky part in these kinds of circumstances. You want to make sure that you have protections for minorities, protections for individual rights, independent courts, freedom of press, freedom of association and all those things tend to be the real inner stuffing of democracy. That's why I think having some kind of process and a constitutional order become very important. You know, these sound like technicalities, but at the moment of transition how you deal with these questions has a huge impact on the kind of eventual political system you end up with.

CNN: Why is that so crucial?

Zakaria: If you look at Iraq, it was the decisions made in the first month [after Saddam Hussein's rule ended] that ended up creating the climate for what became a civil war.

We should try as much as we can to help the Egyptians understand that what they want is a transition that ends up producing stable liberal democracy.

The other key is the role of the army. People haven't completely recognized that Egypt is really a military dictatorship, with a civilian at the top. The army is not going to quietly allow for a democratic order that completely takes away all its powers and privilege, so the army will want to have a very strong role in the process, and that is probably inevitable -- and maybe where the United States has much of its influence because we have maintained pretty good contacts with the army.

CNN: Is a strong role for the army compatible with a more democratic Egypt?

Zakaria: It's compatible as long as the army understands it can't be the old system. In Turkey the army effectively ran the country and began to yield power. It's happened in other countries as well. But unless there's a real process put in place you could easily end up with a pseudo democracy like Pakistan where civilians are elected, but the military wields the real power.

CNN: What are the implications of this for the wider Arab world?

Zakaria: The implications of this will be substantial because Egypt is the heart and soul of the Arab world. The two biggest political movements in the Arab world in the past 50 years have been pan-Arabism or Arab nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism, both of them were centered in Egypt -- pan-Arabism with Nasser and Islamic fundamentalism with the Muslim Brotherhood and also al Qaeda, which was largely a marriage of Egyptian brains and Saudi Arabian money.

You can already see the implications in Jordan. I don't think it means there will be a domino effect and you will see regimes all over the Mideast toppling. But I think you will certainly see a greater demand for accountability and reform, and without any question it will rattle regimes like Syria, and Libya. Whether or not they fall will be a case by case situation. Most of these regimes are very tough police states, so it is not really that easy to protest or do things that would undermine the regime. But I think we're entering a new era in the Middle East, and I think it's impossible that things will remain the same in any of those countries.

CNN: Was America blindsided by these events?

Zakaria: I don't think that's true. The Americans for 15 years now have been urging the Mubarak regime to engage in serious political reforms. The reality is that people sometimes exaggerate American influence. And there was in Washington a concern that you did need Egypt to maintain a peaceful border with Israel, to enforce the embargo on Hamas, to fight al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. Now perhaps this led to us not pushing political reform strongly enough. But since the presidency of Bush senior, Washington has been pushing these issues.

The truth is that the Mubarak regime was a very tough unyielding regime that had decided that it was not going to do any political reform. I think that in the face of that, it was difficult to see how we could have had a huge impact.

But the broader point I'd make is that the reason this is happening in Egypt is that they are aware of the wider world, they are aware that the United States was pushing for reform. They see openness in other parts of the world. This is partly a desire of Egypt to catch up with the rest of the world and become like other modern countries.

Arab Revolutions: From Tunisia To Egypt, Is This The Beginning Of A Trend?

The Huffington Post http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/01/egypt-tunisia-arab-revolution_n_816695.html

Protests continue to sweep Egypt, as the world waits to see if President Hosni Mubarak will be forced from office. Those protesters are not alone. The movement leading the demonstrations in Egypt credited inspiration for their actions to the protesters in Tunisia, and a later protest in Yemen credited the Egyptians. What's going on?

According to Foreign Policy, the successful ouster of autocratic president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali struck a chord with many young, angry Arab populations ready to protest. Writes Ellen Knickmeyer, "The unhappy youth in Tunisia are not alone in the Arab world. On Jan. 25, tens of thousands of young Egyptians took to the pavement in Cairo and other major Egyptian cities in the largest challenge to President Hosni Mubarak's regime in a generation. Other crowds have shaken the streets of Sanaa, Algiers, and Amman."

She also notes, "And rather than the Arab world's usual suspects -- bearded Islamists or jaded leftists -- it is young people, angry at the lack of economic opportunity available to them, who are risking their lives going up against police forces." Why is the Middle Eastern youth so angry? Much of the frustration can be traced to extremely high unemployment rates. As Knickmeyer notes, the unemployment rate for young people in North Africa and the Middle East, who make up sixty percent of the area's population, is four times higher than the average rate in the region.
So why these countries, and not poor nations in general?

CNN's Fareed Zakaria argues that it's not just the joblessness that sparks unrest in these populations; it's the "frustrated expectations" of a group that feels it should be receiving more from society than it has. He notes that far from failing, the Tunisian economy had been growing at five percent a year, and the Egyptian economy "much faster than that." The dictators ruling these countries were unable to accomodate the increasing demands of the nation's youth. As Zakaria puts it, "It is this revolution of rising expectations that often undoes a dictatorship because it is usually unable to handle the growing demands of its citizens."

What are these "growing demands"? Historian Basheer Nafi of the University of London's Birkbeck College told Al Jazeera today, "My feeling is that we are witnessing a second wave of the Arab liberation movement ... In the first wave, the Arabs liberated themselves from colonial powers and foreign domination. I think now, the very heart of the Arab world, the backbone of the Arab world, is leading the move towards freedom and democracy and human rights." There has been a lot of talk about the effect of Twitter, Facebook, and other social media on the revolutions, but one of the largest effects seems to be the anger incurred when these services are denied. In Tunisia, some commentators called it a "WikiLeaks Revolution" because of the unrest stirred by the government blocking the critical leaked cables.

In Egypt, anger has flared over the government's early decisions to block Twitter and Facebook, and to later take the unprecedented step of shutting off the Internet entirely. While social media certainly helped the protestors to organize and communicate, it seems one of their most powerful roles was to serve as a catalyst when they disappeared. As Salman Shaikh of the Brookings Institute points out, "Due to the phenomenal growth of secondary and university-level education, literacy rates among the region's youths have skyrocketed in the past 40 years. The percentage of people living in Arab cities has risen by 50% in the same period." Literate, cosmopolitan people want to communicate. Therefore, argues Shaikh, "Propelled by the young and the digital revolution, citizens will demand nothing less than the right to choose and change their representatives in the future."

The Tunisia riots were set off by a the self-immolation of a 26-year-old man named Mohamed Bouazizi, who killed himself after police seized vegetables he was trying to sell. Michele Penner Angrist, writing in Foreign Affairs, argues that in authoritarian societies, "... people bear an internal cost -- to their sense of autonomy and personal integrity -- of pretending that the status quo is acceptable. And when the cost of pretending becomes intolerably high for a few citizens, sudden and surprising mass protests can erupt." This was the case, she says, with the horrifying suicide of Bouazizi, which other Tunisians felt was too terrible to ignore. After the momentum begins, she writes, "The actions of these few can trigger similar actions by others, who, when they see how many others feel as they do and are willing to show it publicly, join in the opposition. The larger the number of protestors becomes, the more others are willing to join them."

So will these protests continue to spread through the region? It is most likely too soon to tell; after the Tunisian president fled, it was reported that Cairo residents chanted "Mubarak next," but few thought that the massive Egyptian protests would begin so suddenly, and it remains to be seen what the ultimate outcome of the protests will be. However, Marc Lynch in Foreign Policy sees reason for hope. "There are strong reasons to expect most of these regimes to survive, which we shouldn't ignore in a moment of enthusiasm. But we also shouldn't ignore this unmistakable new energy, the revelation of the crumbling foundations of Arab authoritarian regimes, or the continuing surprises which should keep all analysts humble about what might follow," he acknowledges. However, he adds, "The Tunisian example has offered the possibility of success, and models for sustained action by a decentralized network, after a long and dispiriting period of authoritarian retrenchment. Al-Jazeera and the new media have played their role in reshaping political opportunities and narratives, but it is people who have seized those opportunities."